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The Effect on Stockholder’s Wealth on Critical Systems Failure and Remedy: The Boeing 
787 Case. 
 Jayendra Gokhale1, Sunder Raghavan1 and Victor J. Tremblay2 
KEYWORDS: Event Study, Aerospace Industry, Stock Returns. 
CLASSIFICATION: Airline Economics, Aviation Case Study, Air Transport Policy and 
Regulation. 
In this paper we analyze the effect of Boeing Dreamliner 787’s battery problems on stockholder 
wealth. Using the event study methodology, we show that the recall in January of 2013 initially 
caused the company’s cumulative abnormal returns to fall by almost 4% in four trading days 
after the recall. This was followed by an announcement by two major airlines to ground all of the 
787 Dreamliner jets. The FAA also ordered all US airlines to ground their 787s and announced 
an investigation to review all critical systems of 787s. However within four months of the 
investigation, FAA approved Boeing’s revisions to its 787 design. This caused Boeing’s 
abnormal returns to rise by almost 2%. On April 24th Boeing reported it’s greater than expected 
quarterly results which caused its abnormal returns to rise by an additional 3%. The Boeing case 
provides us an opportunity to study how critical mistakes can change the value of a 
manufacturer. It also shows how critical it is for the company to redeem itself by quickly 
addressing a crisis situation. 
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Phone: (386) 226 4967, Fax: (386) 226 6696 
Email: gokhalej@erau.edu, ragha8d6@erau.edu.v.tremblay@oregonstate.edu 
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I. Introduction 
There is documented research that product harm crises and product recalls damage the value 
of a firm. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly (1987) found evidence of 
negative effect of recalls by automobile firms on stock returns. Gokhale et al. (2014) find 
evidence of negative stock market reaction to recalls made by Toyota in 2010 due to its sticky 
accelerator pedal. In this study we study the stock market reaction to the reports of fire in battery 
unit of several Boeing 787 Dreamliners, subsequent groundings and investigation by the FAA 
and its effect on Boeing’s financials. 
The Boeing 787 has faced several operational problems and aviation incidents since its 
rollout in 2007. The CEO of Boeing Mr. James McNerney described as those similar with the 
rollout of new models of passenger airplanes. Among the many problems that it faced, the 
Boeing 787’s main problem has been a problem with its battery. In January of 2013, there were 
reports of fire in the fuel cell compartment of an empty 787 operated by Japan Airlines (JAL). 
This was followed by similar reports by All Nippon Airways (ANA), United Airlines (UAL), 
Ethiopian Airlines. The FAA announced a comprehensive review of all critical process of the 
787 Dreamliner. All 787s were grounded and Boeing halted the deliveries of new 787s until a fix 
to battery problems was found. 
While looking at product harm crises, an individual event may not be as interesting or 
significant for a firm’s revenues in the short run. However if the event is life threatening such as 
the sticky accelerator pedal (Gokhale et al. 2014) or a fire in the battery unit of an aircraft can 
have a serious effect on the reputation of the firm. In this paper we analyze the financial impact 
of the Dreamliner groundings made by Boeing due to battery problems. Just like the sticky 
accelerator pedal problem with Toyota, this problem was due to reasons internal to the company. 
Several prior studies investigate the relationship between stock returns of companies and 
catastrophic events such as airline crashes (Barrett et al. 1987; Davidson et al. 1987) and the 
September 11 terrorist attacks (Carter and Simkins 2004; Guzhva 2008). However, this 
investigation differs from these earlier studies because of the nature of firm involvement 
(external versus internal). 
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Following the groundings, Boeing worked on a fix to resolve the battery issue. They 
addressed the fix in three ways (Sinnett 2013). First they made manufacturing improvements by 
enhancing battery construction process and quality control. Second, they made changes to the 
engineering design of the battery. Third, they added an enclosure to the battery unit. After 
working with the FAA, Boeing got a clearance from the FAA on April 19, 2013 that their 
proposed modifications would make the Dreamliner airworthy. The following week, on April 
23rd Boeing reported better than expected financial results even after the groundings negatively 
affected the company image. Thus the Boeing case provides us with an excellent opportunity to 
study three distinct events around the 787 Dreamliner groundings. The first event is a series of 
instances of fires reported by different airlines operating the Dreamliner. The second is the 
clearance by the FAA, an independent government organization regarding the safety of the 
Dreamliner. The third is the announcement of financial results by the company following the 
events. 
 We use the event study methodology to estimate the effect on Boeing’s stock returns due 
to the battery fire and groundings. We want to see if these events have an impact on the value of 
the firm given the sensitive nature of the product being involved (an aircraft) and if the clearance 
by the FAA can reverse the damage to the company reputation if any caused by the problem. Our 
results indicate that the investors felt that the problem was major and that following the clearance 
by the FAA, Boeing had indeed settled the problem. The investors were positively surprised by 
Boeing’s financial results that followed which showed that notwithstanding the battery problems, 
the firm had done a remarkable job of damage control to its reputation. This paper is organized 
as follows. Section II describes a timeline of the events. Section III describes the event study 
method. Section IV describes data and empirical results. Section V concludes. 
II. Boeing and the Dreamliner battery problems in 2013 
 The Dreamliner has faced several problems both before and since its first delivery in late 
2011. Its first customer was All Nippon Airways with an order of 50 aircraft and a scheduled 
delivery of 2007. However, several testing delays and clearances caused the company to make its 
first delivery of the aircraft in September 2011. A few glitches and errors related to engines were 
subsequently corrected through 2012. However on January 7, 2013 a fire broke out in an empty 
JAL Dreamliner in Boston. The next day there was report of a fuel leak on a JAL Dreamliner. On 
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January 9, UAL reported problem with wiring near the battery of one of its 787. The National 
Transportation Security Board (NTSB) announced the launch of an investigation. On January 11 
and 13, two JAL Dreamliners were found to have fuel leaks. On January 16, an ANA Dreamliner 
reported having a battery fire and was diverted in the middle of its flight and grounded. 
Consequently all Dreamliners in operation at the time were grounded until further investigation. 
Boeing also announced that deliveries would be halted until battery problem was solved. 
III. Event Study Analysis 
We use the event study method to investigate the effect of the circumstances related to the 
battery problems on returns of Boeing stock. The event study method was developed by Ball and 
Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969).1 The event study technique is a common method used to 
study effect of manufacturing shortcomings and product recalls. Some examples of application 
of the event study method in the airline sector include studies by Ceshney et al. (2011), Liu et al. 
(2013), Jayanti and Jayanti (2009), Mizuno and Hanabusa (2011). The event study approach is 
based on the assumption that returns from a stock are driven by the returns from the broad 
market ceteris paribus. This is captured in the market model, which is based on the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis which assumes the price of a stock reflects all currently available 
information in the marketplace. More specifically, the return of a stock i at time t (R୧୲), is 
expressed as a function of market information. This market information is typically measured as 
the return on a portfolio of stocks (R୫୲). These include the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA), the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500) etc. In the market model, ܴ௜௧ is expressed 
as:  
 R୧୲ ൌ α୧ ൅ β୧R୫୲ ൅ ε୧୲,       (1) 
 where, ε୧୲	~	Nሺ0, σଶሻ,       
ε୧୲, the error term is assumed to follow a random walk. If all available information is captured in 
the stock returns through market return relationship as captured by the efficient markets 
hypothesis, expected value of ߝ௜௧ is zero. 
                                                            
1 For more recent reviews of this method, see Thomson (1985), Armitage (1995), MacKinlay (1997), 
Bhagat and Romano (2002a, 2002b) and Corrado (2011). 
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The goal of this study is to test the null hypothesis that an abnormal event such as safety issue 
with an airplane has no effect on the manufacturing company’s expected returns. Thus we define 
abnormal return as the difference of ex post return and the normal expected return, which is 
conditioned on the situation that the abnormal safety event never took place. To be precise, the 
abnormal return (AR) for firm i at event date τ is 
 AR୧த ൌ R୧த െ EሺR୧த|R୫தሻ,       (2) 
In case of the market model ܣܴ௜ఛ will be 
 ܣܴ௜ఛ ൌ 	ܴ௜ఛ െ ߙො െ ߚመܴ௠ఛ 
EሺR୧த|R୫தሻ  is the expected return and R୫த is the market return (which is the conditioning 
information). In other words, R୫த is the information that is used to predict expected returns 
assuming no abnormal event. 
 In the event study method, the relation between ܴ௜௧ and ܴ௠௧ is measured in the estimation 
window. This allows us to estimate the sample value of ߙො௜ and ߚመ௜. Let Wpre be the length of the 
estimation window and Tpre be the number of observations in the estimation window. The value 
of Tpre needs to be sufficiently long and yet should not include any abnormal events, which may 
cause the estimates  ߙො௜ and ߚመ௜ to be unstable. Let Wevent be the length of the event window, which 
starts at ߬=0. This is before the official start of the event if there are fears of information leakage. 
The length of Wevent is > 1 if there are inefficiencies in transmission of information to investors, 
or if the event studied is a complex series of smaller events. In such a case, ߬ extends through 
several trading days. 
 Using the estimated values of αiෝ  and βi෡  from Wpre, we can estimate abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). CARs aggregate abnormal returns over the event window. 
If an event does not have an impact on returns, then ARs (and hence CARs) would not be 
statistically significant. A negative (positive) event would produce negative (positive) ARs and 
CARs. 
If Wevent ranges from τ1 to τ2, then 
 CAR୧த ൌ ∑ AR୧ததమ୲ୀதభ .         (5) 
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 In addition to the market model, we also estimate ARs using the Fama French 3-Factor 
model and the 4-Factor model. In the three factor model, there are two additional regressors. 
SMB (the variable ‘Small minus Big’) – which represents the anomalies that occur due to the 
size difference of firms and HML (the variable High minus Low) which occurs due to some 
stock being more growth oriented vis-à-vis value oriented stocks (in today’s world stocks such as 
Tesla can be perceived as growth stocks while Apple, IBM etc. can be perceived as value 
stocks). 
 R୧୲ ൌ α୧ ൅ β୧R୫୲ ൅ β୧ୗ୑୆SMB୫୲ ൅	β୧ୌ୑୐HML୫୲ ൅ ε୧୲   (6) 
 In yet another specification, we augment the 3-factor model by a momentum factor 
(MOMmt) on winners and losers for the market in addition to SMBmt, HMLmt and Rmt. This is 
based on the theory that stocks which have price momentum in their favor (for example due to 
consistent earnings beat) tend to outperform stocks which do not have momentum. 
 R୧୲ ൌ α୧ ൅ β୧R୫୲ ൅ β୧ୗ୑୆SMB୫୲ ൅	β୧ୌ୑୐HML୫୲ ൅	β୧୑୓୑MOM୫୲ ൅ ε୧୲ (7) 
To account for risk, we also employ the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which uses the correlation 
of riskiness of a stock to the riskiness of the market to predict AR and CAR. This model uses risk 
free rate (the interest rate on the 1-month treasury bill) in the equation below, 
 R୧୲ ൌ R୤୲ ൅ β୧ሺR୫୲ െ	R୤୲ሻ ൅	ε୧୲      (8) 
IV. Data and Estimation Techniques 
The data consists of returns from Boeing Stock and that from the S&P 500 Index obtained from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices available from the Wharton Research Data Services 
from the University of Pennsylvania. We use estimation period window of 250 days preceding 
the first event (battery fire in 787 at Boston’s Logan International Airport). We study the 
following events: 
Event 1:  January 7, 2013 Fire breaks out in empty 787 JAL Dreamliner in Boston 
Event 2:  January 8, 2013 A 787 JAL Dreamliner suffers a fuel leak and flight out of 
Boston 
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Event 3:  January 11, 2013 FAA announces a comprehensive review of all critical 
systems of Boeing 787 
Event 4:  January 16, 2013 battery fire detected in an airborne ANA flight from Ube 
to Tokyo. All Boeing 787s were grounded and delivery of new 787s was 
halted until a resolution of the issue was found. 
Event 5:  April 19, 2013 FAA approves the battery design fix proposed by Boeing 
Event 6:  April 24, 2013, Boeing announces better than expected quarterly financial 
results 
We test for robustness of the results using a 90-day and a 180-day window and find that 
results are consistent across the three estimation windows. We use a 50-day estimation window 
for events during April of 2013. However, the 50-day estimation window for events 5 and 6 does 
not guarantee loss of contamination from the previous events. So we use the 250 day estimation 
window used in Events 1 through 4 for these events as well. We use a single day event window 
because some these events are spaced very closely. All events except the clearance by the FAA 
are unanticipated. Table 1 presents a summary of different estimation and event windows used. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of data used for regression. Table 3 presents results of 
regression and OLS parameter estimates. There is a positive and significant association between 
Boeing returns and market returns. These parameter estimates are then used to generate expected 
returns and abnormal returns from each event. To analyze if abnormal return associated with 
each event is significantly different from zero, we carried out parametric test. The abnormal 
returns and significance calculated using the market model are listed in table 4. We find that the 
first event of the fire, produced abnormal returns of -1.7% significant at 5% level. The event next 
day of another fire in JAL Dreamliner caused abnormal returns of -2.3% significant at 1% level. 
Abnormal returns for the third event of announcement of review of critical systems of 787 by the 
FAA were -2.47% significant at 1%. This shows that the markets were getting prepared for the 
worst case scenario on the Dreamliner. For the battery fire in airborne ANA flight incident 
(Event 4), abnormal returns were -3.37% significant at 1%. For the event in which the FAA 
approved battery design fix (Event 5), abnormal returns were 1.3% (significant at 10%). For the 
event in which Boeing surprised investors with positive earnings surprise (Event 6), abnormal 
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returns were 3.03% significant at 1% level. These results are further corroborated by the 3-factor 
model (table 5), the 4-factor model (table 6) and the CAPM model (table 7).2 The abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns for events 1-4 are shown in figure 1 and for events 5 
and 6 are as in figure 2. 
The empirical results are significant given the fact that events associated with accidents 
or reports related to fire produced negative abnormal returns while events related to the fix and 
positive earnings surprise produced positive abnormal returns. These are consistent with investor 
expectations. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
We estimate the extent to which a chain of negative events related to the battery problems 
of Boeing Dreamliner affected the returns of Boeing stock. These involve four major reports 
associated with battery fire or fuel leak in different Dreamliner aircrafts on different days. This 
was followed by grounding of all Dreamliner aircrafts delivered until then by Boeing and 
suspension of delivery of new Dreamliners. All these events produced negative abnormal returns. 
The FAA announced an investigation of the issue. Boeing created a fix for the problem and the 
FAA declared that the fix was good. This was followed by a positive earnings surprise by 
Boeing. Both these events produced positive abnormal returns. 
 This evidence supports two main conclusions. The reports of accidents made the 
investors nervous about the financial impact on Boeing’s financial value. Clearance of the fix by 
the FAA exonerated the company of its previous design flaw and reassured the investors that the 
problem had been solved. The announcement of financial results by the company further 
reassured the investors that the company had tackled the issue successfully despite the 
groundings and non-delivery of new aircraft. This case provides an excellent opportunity to 
study how a company can successfully navigate product harm crisis. 
  
                                                            
2 We also considered a smaller estimation window of 55 days (after events 1 – 4) for events 5 and 6 and found that 
the ARs for events 5 and 6 were still robust but significance levels dropped. 
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Table 1 Description of Estimation and Event Windows 
Estimation/ Event 
Window 
Dates Brief Description 
Estimation Window 01/03/2012 
to 01/02/2013 
251 trading days in the previous year 
Event 1 01/07/2013 Fire breaks out in empty 787 JAL Dreamliner in Boston 
Event 2 01/08/2013 A 787 JAL Dreamliner suffers a fuel leak 
Event 3 01/13/2013 Fuel leak in another JAL 787 Dreamliner 
Event 4 01/16/2013 Battery fire detected in an airborne ANA flight from 
Ube to Tokyo. All Boeing 787s grounded and delivery 
of new 787s halted until resolution of the issue. 
Event 5 04/19/2013 FAA approval for the battery design fix proposed by 
Boeing 
Event 6 04/24/2013 Better than expected quarterly results announced by 
Boeing 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  
 
Description N 
 
Mean 
(×102) 
Std. Dev. 
(×102) 
Min 
(×102) 
Max 
(×102) 
Rit  Returns from Boeing stock 251 0.0362 1.1788 -3.6213 5.2862 
Rmt  Returns from S&P 500 Index 251 0.0635 0.8178 -2.4643 2.5403 
 
Table 3 Regression Results from Estimation Period       
 Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic P> |t| 
Intercept -0.0003 0.00054 -00.51 0.609 
Rmt +1.0031 0.06560 +15.29 0.000 
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Table 4 Abnormal return (AR), standard error of abnormal returns (SAR) and p-value of 
abnormal returns (PSAR) for 6 events related to Boeing Battery Problems using the market 
model 
Date Event Number AR (×102) SAR PSAR 
1/7/2013 Event 1  -1.6673** -1.9606 0.026 
1/8/2013 Event 2  -2.2744*** -2.6746 0.004 
1/11/2013 Event 3  -2.4713*** -2.9073 0.002 
1/16/2013 Event 4  -3.3716*** -3.9665 0.000 
4/19/2013 Event 5 +1.2765* +1.4987 0.068 
4/24/2013 Event 6 +3.0321*** +3.5671 0.000 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Table 5 Abnormal return (AR), standard error of abnormal returns (SAR) and p-value of 
abnormal returns (PSAR) for 6 events related to Boeing Battery Problems using the 3-factor 
model 
Date Event Number AR (×102) SAR PSAR 
1/7/2013 Event 1  -1.8515** -2.2063 0.014 
1/8/2013 Event 2  -2.2715*** -2.7067 0.004 
1/11/2013 Event 3  -2.6427*** -3.1503 0.001 
1/16/2013 Event 4  -3.3183*** -3.9665 0.000 
4/19/2013 Event 5 +1.3342* +1.5873 0.057 
4/24/2013 Event 6 +3.4926*** +4.1635 0.000 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 6 Abnormal return (AR), standard error of abnormal returns (SAR) and p-value of 
abnormal returns (PSAR) for 6 events related to Boeing Battery Problems using the 4-factor 
model 
Date Event Number AR (×102) SAR PSAR 
1/7/2013 Event 1  -1.8636** -2.2176 0.014 
1/8/2013 Event 2  -2.2293*** -2.6526 0.004 
1/11/2013 Event 3  -2.6646*** -3.1721 0.001 
1/16/2013 Event 4  -3.3077*** -3.9376 0.000 
4/19/2013 Event 5 +1.4274** +1.6958 0.046 
4/24/2013 Event 6 +3.4766*** +4.1387 0.000 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Table 7 Abnormal return (AR), standard error of abnormal returns (SAR) and p-value of 
abnormal returns (PSAR) for 6 events related to Boeing Battery Problems using the CAPM 
model 
Date Event Number AR (×102) SAR PSAR 
1/7/2013 Event 1  -1.6673** -1.9606 0.026 
1/8/2013 Event 2  -2.2744*** -2.6746 0.004 
1/11/2013 Event 3  -2.4713*** -2.9073 0.002 
1/16/2013 Event 4  -3.3716*** -3.9665 0.000 
4/19/2013 Event 5 +1.2765* +1.4987 0.068 
4/24/2013 Event 6 +3.0321*** +3.5671 0.000 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Figure 1 Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for Boeing for 
events 1 to 4 
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Figure 2 Abnormal Returns (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for Boeing for 
events 5 and 6 
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